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TRADING VOTES FOR REASONING:
COVERING IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS
STEPHEN J. CHOI* & G. MITU GULATI t
ABSTRACT
Studies report that judges who are on panels with at least one other
judge of a different political party (a "mixed panel") tend to moderate
their votes, particularly when cases involve politically charged subject
matter. We examine whether this moderation in voting is the product of
bargaining among mixed panel judges, where authoring judges, who might
otherwise face a dissenting vote (or find themselves in dissent), trade their
votes for the ability to craft the reasoning in a unanimous majority opinion
closer to their own policy preferences and thereby affect the opinion's
precedential value. Using citation patterns within opinions as a proxy for
how judges reason, we report that authoring judges on mixed panels do not
moderate their reasoning when it comes to opinions relating to salient
subject matter areas. Partisan reasoning in top salient areas is also higher
when the authoring judges have more bargaining leverage over opposite
party judges on the same panel. Finally, partisan reasoning in top salient
areas is greatest among authoring judges who have the most skill at
writing influential opinions. The foregoing is consistent with the theory that
judges engage in covering: moderating their voting when associated with
an opposite party judge on the same panel, a highly visible activity, but
adjusting the reasoning in the opinion to tilt the decision back toward the
authoring judge's own preferred ideological position, a less visible activity,
done under the cover of the more visible, moderated vote.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Does law matter? To most lawyers, the answer is obviously yes. To
many social scientists studying the courts, the answer is just as obviously
no. The empirical literature on judicial behavior is dominated by studies of
the voting patterns of judges, much of it by social scientists.1 Focus tends
to be on the extent to which political affiliation explains judicial voting
patterns. 2 To the befuddlement of legal scholars, the social science
empirical literature discounts the importance of precedent as an
independent constraint on judicial voting.3 Instead, many social scientists
take a strong realist position, viewing reasoning in opinions as irrelevant
and explaining judges' votes as primarily driven by factors such as policy
preferences (the "social science model").4 By contrast, legal scholars, even
the realists among us, believe that law matters in determining outcomes. 5
Judges, even if they have policy preferences, are constrained by precedent;
the creation of precedent within the reasoning of an opinion, in turn, is an
1. See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 384 (2007).
2. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993) (articulating the attitudinal model that posits that Supreme Court
decisions reflect the ideological preferences of the justices).
3. See Kim, supra note 1, at 384. See also Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, hat Is Legal
Doctrine?, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 517, 518 (2006) (urging that more attention to legal doctrine be paid by
social scientists studying the courts).
4. See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 261-62 (2006); Kim,
supra note 1, at 384. Frank Cross notes that political scientists have ridiculed the theory that judges
decide according to the law as "meaningless,... acerebral, irrational, or no more a science than creative
writing, necromancy, or finger painting." FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS 11 (2007) (internal quotes omitted).
5. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 8-9 (2008). Cf Tracey E. George, Developing
a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1643-45
(1998) (contrasting the legal and political science models of studying judicial behavior).
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important part of the role of judging. Whether an opinion is written broadly
or narrowly, or imposes a rule or a standard, does matter. Judges will not
issue an opinion if"it does not write" (the "law model").6
Scholarship that tests the importance of legal opinions separate from
voting outcomes is growing.7 Included are attempts to examine judicial
reasoning patterns empirically, a task that requires converting reasoning
patterns into a quantifiable form. 8 One method is to look to citation
patterns. Citations to other opinions, both as precedent and as support
without direct precedential value, are a key element of legal analysis.
Therefore, it is natural that legal scholars would look to data on citations as
an indicator of whether judges care about the opinion itself separate from
their vote. At least three studies find indications of systematic political bias
in citation patterns.9 The question is whether the presence of political bias
in citations indicates, contrary to what the strong realist model might
predict, that judges care not only about votes, but also about the reasoning
6. See Kim, supra note 1. See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989) ("[W]hen the Supreme Court... decides a case, not merely the
outcome of that decision, but the mode of analysis that it applies will thereafter be followed by the
lower courts ... [It] can either establish general rules or leave ample discretion for the future.").
The "it will not write" quote is one that we have heard informally from many judges; it seems to capture
their notion of being constrained by precedent even when their intuitions (or policy preferences) tell
them to vote differently. See FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 57,
161 (1994); Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (and Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1421, 1446-48 (1995).
7. E.g., DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 7-8
(2002); Stefanie Lindquist & Frank Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin's Chain Novel Theory:
Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1158 (2005); Donald R. Songer & Susan
Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial Voting: Obscentiy Cases in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 963, 964-65 (1992); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 669 (2004).
8. E.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15-29 (2005); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The
Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and
Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 221-22 (2006); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P.
Moriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1438 (1998).
9. See Mita Bhattacharya & Russell Smyth, The Determinants of Judicial Prestige and
Influence: Some Empirical Evidence from the High Court ofAustralia, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 223, 249-50
(2001); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of
Judges, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Citation Bias]; Michael
Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Citation to Legislative History: Contextual Theory and
Empirical Analysis 20 (July 29, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). But see William
M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal
Courts of Appeal Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 325 (1998) (finding no significant effect of federal
appeals court judges' political party affiliations on their opinions' citations in the context of a
multivariate analysis of citation frequency).
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in opinions.' 0 If outcomes in cases were driven purely by policy
preferences and precedent was irrelevant, the argument goes, we should not
observe discernable patterns in citations.1" Instead, we should expect few or
random citations. The presence of bias in citation patterns suggests a
middle ground between the legal and social science models. Judges may
vote in opinions to advance their policy preferences (consistent with the
social science model), but biases in citation patterns also suggest that
judges, even while pursuing policy preferences, face constraints leading
them to justify their votes given the existing legal precedent (consistent
with the law model). 2
The foregoing argument may be suggestive, but it is incomplete. The
fact that there are biased patterns in citations as well as in voting does not
necessarily show that legal precedent and reasoning matter. The citation
studies reporting ideological bias may simply be observing the equivalent
of the dog walking ahead of her walker; it does not mean that the dog is
leading. Judges may decide first how to vote and then write the opinion (or
assign the writing to their clerks), using the opinion as window dressing.
Under one view, judges do not care about precedent or the reasoning in
their opinions, but they engage in legal reasoning and take precedent into
account either because there is a need to justify decisions to a public that
believes judges should follow law or because there are other relevant actors
(other judges, the legislature) who care about whether adequate legal
justifications are provided. 13
The question, therefore, is how to test whether judges care about
reasoning independent of their decision regarding how to vote in any given
10. Choi & Gulati, Citation Bias, supra note 9, at 3.
11. A version of this argument is that opinion writing is largely delegated to law clerks, who
simply cite whatever cases they find first.
12. One explanation for judges' attempts to follow precedent has to do with their audiences. For
judges-especially those who care about their own precedents being followed by other judges-a key
portion of their audience is made up of other judges. Judges likely care about their legacies in terms of
the law they create, and that in turn likely generates a reciprocal norm among judges to generally follow
precedent. For a judge to write opinions without justifying them in terms of precedent would likely
bring the displeasure of members of this audience, an audience judges need to please if they wish their
precedents to be respected. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 160 (2006). Cf Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive
Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (explaining why judges
might feel constrained to justify their decisions as being consistent with existing law, even while
attempting to push their private policy preferences).
13. E.g., Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent and
Intrajudicial Communication, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 755, 755 (2002) (explaining that judicial
adherences to precedent is explained by judges' concern regarding external effects; that is, judges care
about precedent so as to be able to influence policy).
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case. If we find that judges are willing to trade their votes for modifications
in the reasoning employed in the opinion (or better, for the right to craft the
reasoning), it would follow that at least some judges believe that precedent
matters, and that it sometimes matters more than the outcome in the case at
issue.
Judges in a variety of settings have been found to display ideological
biases in their voting. 14 That is, judges tend to vote in a manner consistent
with the platform of the party that appointed them. Judges also, in
attempting to further their policy preferences, vote strategically in terms of
reacting to or anticipating the decisions of other judges on the same court,
judges on other courts, the legislative branch, and the executive branch. 15
Most relevant for our purposes, recent research has found that judges on
multimember panels vote differently when they are on panels of uniform
political persuasion than when they are on panels of mixed political
persuasion. 16
The multimember panel studies indicate that the votes of judges are
influenced by the ideologies of other judges on the same panel. Either to
maintain collegiality, to avoid a judge's breaking away to author a
dissenting opinion, or simply because of group dynamics, judges appear to
moderate their voting in settings where there is potential diversity in
political views. Legal scholars Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller report that
14. See C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS 56 (1996); James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward
Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO STATE L.J.
1675, 1717-20 (1999); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175 (1998);
Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Toward an Integrated Model of Judicial Voting Behavior, 20 AM.
POL. Q. 147, 158-63 (1992); Donald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on
Voting Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1955-1986, 43 W. POL. Q. 317, 330 (1990);
Songer & Haire, supra note 7, at 964.
15. See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look
Back, A Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES. Q. 625, 638-39 (2000); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717, 1767 (1997).
16. See CROSS, supra note 4, at 148-77; POSNER, supra note 5, at 25 (describing the panel
studies); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 17-45 (2006); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 851-52 (2006); Revesz, supra
note 15, at 1765-66. Panel effects have also been examined with respect to other factors, such as
gender, for example, and scholars have asked whether the presence of a female judge on a panel alters
the probability of the panel finding in favor of the plaintiff in a discrimination lawsuit. See Jennifer L.
Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts,
114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1779-83 (2005); Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling
the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging 23 (Apr. 24, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://adm.wustl.edu/media/working/gendejudging.pdf).
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the presence of a "whistleblower" judge whose policy preferences differ
from the majority of a panel of judges (and who may expose the majority's
ideological-driven manipulation of doctrine) plays a moderating role in
how judges on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vote to decide cases. 17 In
a study of the same court, Richard Revesz found that the ideology of the
other judges on a panel is more determinative of how an individual judge
will vote than the judge's own political affiliation.' 8 Cass Sunstein and his
coauthors examined the importance of panel composition for federal
appellate court decisions in a number of specific subject areas.19 They
concluded that judges in several areas involving controversial subject
matter, such as affirmative action, sex discrimination, and sexual
harassment, act strategically in their voting and engage in the most partisan
voting when the panel consists of judges with similar political
preferences. 20 They also found, however, that the presence of even one
opposite party judge has a moderating influence on this ideological voting
tendency. 2
1
While finding that judges on a mixed panel tend to moderate their
votes, none of the studies tackle the possibility that some of this moderation
may be the result of bargaining among the judges.22 Instead, the
moderation is explained as either the result of a desire to avoid the red flag
that a dissent provides to higher courts, or the result of a check on group-
polarization that is provided by the presence of a nonmember of the
group.23 The assumption offered is that the observed moderation in voting
17. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 14, at 2172. Cross and Tiller's sample is drawn from cases
decided from 1991 to 1995 that cite Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Id. at 2168.
18. Revesz examines the influence of panel composition on how judges voted to decide cases
involving challenges to decisions by the Environmental Protection Agency from 1970 to 1994. Revesz,
supra note 15, at 1719 ("[l]n fact, the party affiliation of the other judges on the panel has a greater
bearing on a judge's vote than his or her own affiliation.").
19. See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 305 (2004) [hereinafter
Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting].
20. See id. at 316-29 (reporting that "Democratic appointees, sitting with two Democratic
appointees, are about twice as likely to vote in the stereotypically liberal fashion as are Republican
appointees, sitting with two Republican appointees").
21. See id. at 304-05, 318-27.
22. While Revesz does not address the bargaining hypothesis with respect to judges on a panel,
he mentions at least two related hypotheses. First, he hypothesizes that judges might moderate their
votes out of fear of being overruled by a higher panel (which can be conceptualized as a bargain among
the judges at different levels) and second, he hypothesizes that judges might moderate their votes so as
to avoid the cost of writing a time-consuming dissent. See Revesz, supra note 15, at 1733-37.
23. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 14, at 2172; Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting, supra note 19.
Sunstein's work on panel effects builds on his prior work on the importance of dissenting voices in
[Vol. 81:735
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on mixed panels likely corresponds to a moderation in reasoning on those
same types of panels. 24
We question the explanation for moderation in voting. Moderation
could also result from bargains struck among judges with different
preferences and consequently may lead to more, not less, partisanship in
the reasoning of the opinions. A strong incentive to avoid a dissent may
lead to such a bargain (in a way different from the simple desire to avoid
signaling a "red flag" to a higher court). Judges may view a dissent as
undermining the precedential authority of the majority opinion. Those who
author the dissent will expend scarce resources writing it and will not
receive any precedential authority from their opinion. A desire to obtain
control over the authorship of the opinion may also lead a judge to bargain.
Authorship is important, giving the authoring judge the ability to craft
reasoning in a low visibility way tilted toward the authoring judge's own
preferred policy position that will have stronger precedential weight (due to
the unanimous vote outcome). To avoid a dissent and to obtain the right to
author the now unanimous opinion, judges may moderate their votes. Two
Republican judges on a panel with one Democrat, for example, may
moderate their vote in a case toward the Democrat's preferred outcome. In
return for the trade of their votes (by moderating their voting position to
avoid the dissent), the two Republican judges receive the right to author a
unanimous majority opinion. One can also imagine a potential lone
dissenter who chooses to vote along with the majority in return for the right
to author the opinion, thereby gaining the ability to adjust the reasoning
more toward the dissenter's preferred position.
moderating group behavior. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 166-89 (2003).
Sunstein and his coauthors suggest that group polarization results when group members who think alike
reinforce each others' ideas and give each other additional confidence. See Sunstein et al., Ideological
Voting, supra note 19, at 341-43.
24. A recent article surveying the panel effects research explains:
Although extremely difficult to measure, the suspicion is that the content of written judicial
opinions may be affected by ideological amplification as well. Along those lines, Emerson
Tiller and Frank Cross have suggested that the presence of a non-uniform viewpoint can
significantly affect the terms of an opinion, even if that viewpoint is not expressed in the form
of a formal dissent. Part of the explanation for that may be that the writing judge responds to
the threat of a dissent and consciously moderates the opinion from a more extreme form in
order to achieve unanimity. Yet even more plausible is that no conscious moderation occurs;
instead, the opinion is less extreme because the presence of ideological diversity naturally
moderates the decisionmaking of the drafter. In either case, the end result is that ideological
amplification may impact the performance of a panel's dispute resolution function (by
affecting the direction in which a dispute is decided) as well as its case law production
function (by affecting the terms of the opinion expressing that decision).
Samuel P. Jordan, Early Panel Announcement, Settlement and Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 55, 93
(2007) (citing Cross & Tiller, supra note 14, at 2156-57 and Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting, supra
note 19, at 307) (suggesting that the reasoning patterns would be moderated on mixed panels, just as
voting patterns).
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Some judges also care more about the voting outcome of a particular
case (termed "outcome" judges) while other judges care more about the
legal precedent established through the reasoning contained in the majority
opinion accompanying the outcome (termed "precedent" judges). When
faced with a panel of judges of mixed ideological persuasion, precedent
judges trade off their votes, resulting in moderation, for the right to write
the opinion (or have another judge of similar ideological persuasion on the
same panel write the opinion). We are suggesting a form of logrolling-
behavior considered common in legislatures. But the view with respect to
courts appears to be that judges would not engage in such unseemly
behavior.25
Our theory predicts that the reasoning within opinions matters, hence
the desire on the part of some judges to moderate their votes to gain control
over the wording of the opinion itself. Judges who obtain control over the
opinion after a trade with judges of a different political persuasion may use
the opinion to moderate the voting outcome of the case, thereby bringing
the subsequent precedent more in line with the authoring judge's own
political views (a practice we refer to as "covering" 26). Put another way,
judges use the more visible and more moderate vote as covering for the less
visible and more partisan legal opinion. The theory also predicts that those
judges who care most about precedent and are skilled at crafting the type of
precedent that has broad impact will systematically trade their votes for the
ability to write or otherwise affect the shape of the legal opinion.
We use outside circuit citations at the level of individual opinions as a
measure of the ideological tilt in the judicial reasoning. Citations to
authority are key to the construction of legal arguments. Since those
arguments and rationales form the essence of precedent, examining citation
patterns furnishes an objective method of unpacking precedent for the
25. See CROSS, supra note 4, at 156-57 (discussing the question of whether judges on
multimember panels trade votes). Note, though, that while no one suggests that explicit vote trading
occurs, there is recognition in the literature that implicit bargaining occurs. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 106 (1988); Pamela C. Corley, Bargaining and Accomodation
of the United States Supreme Court: Insight From Justice Blackmun, 90 JUDICATURE 157, 157 (2007).
26. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Ranking Judges According to Citation Bias (As a
Means to Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279, 1282 (2007). The term "covering" is taken
from the work of sociologist Erving Goffman, who used it to describe everyday behavior where
individuals often "cover" their sincere identities so as to achieve goals. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA:
NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 102-04 (1968). The term has received attention in
legal scholarship in recent years because of its use by scholars writing in the area of identity politics and
performance, who are building on Goffman's work. E.g., KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN
ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 18 (2006).
[Vol. 81:735
HeinOnline -- 81 S. Cal. L. Rev.  742 2007-20082
TRADING VOTES
presence of biases. 27 A judge could write an opinion relying solely on
inside circuit citations and precedent. Cases that reach the federal appeals
courts, and particularly those that result in published opinions, however,
often contain novel issues for which inside circuit precedent provides no
answer. Authority from outside circuit judges bolsters an argument that
might be weak if based only on inside circuit authority.28 An argument
backed with outside citations indicates that the position is accepted by other
jurists. Outside circuit authority also provides evidence that the position is
more broadly accepted than in just one circuit, thus reducing the likelihood
of reversal by a higher court. Our study provides an opinion-level
examination of the outside citation practices of federal appellate court
judges from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 1999, allowing us to assess
bias in reasoning at the level of individual opinions.
29
The evidence suggests that judges do engage in covering. Authoring
judges may moderate their vote, prior research tells us, when faced with
other judges on the same panel with different political preferences. 30 In
subject matter areas that are less salient to the public and thus have lower
stakes, we find that the authoring judges write opinions with reasoning that
tilts toward the position of the other judges with different political
preferences. In more salient, higher stakes subject matter areas, however,
we report that authoring judges write opinions that tilt against the position
of the other judges with different political preferences. While such judges
may moderate their voting, they compensate with more partisan opinions.
The covering effect is most significant for judges who face only one judge
27. Recent articles, some using network analysis, have used citation data to study patterns in the
growth of precedent. E.g., James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal
Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 325-26 (2007); Frank B.
Cross, Thomas A. Smith & Antonio Tomarchio, Determinants of Cohesion in the Supreme Court's
Network of Precedents 2 (San Diego Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 07-67, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=924 110.
28. See David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State
Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 337, 344 (1997). See also Shannon
lshiyama Smithey, A Tool, Not a Master: The Use of Foreign Case Law in Canada and South Africa,
34 CoMp. POL. STUD. 1188 (2001) (examining outside citations-to foreign law materials-that judges
rely on to cut information costs, decrease uncertainty, and provide justification).
29. Most studies of judicial citations examine the aggregate numbers of citations a judge
receives and do not focus on the citation patterns within individual opinions. Scholars measuring
judicial influence, for example, have used the aggregate outside circuit citations received as a measure
of the influence of federal circuit court judges. See Landes et al., supra note 9, at 325. Others have
counted the invocations of a specific judge's name in judicial opinions as a measure of that judge's
prestige. See David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the
U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 376 (1999).
30. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16; Cross & Tiller, supra note 14; Revesz, supra note
2008]
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of the opposite party in a three-judge panel. Judges who outnumber an
opposite party judge have more bargaining leverage and thus may have a
greater ability to shift the reasoning of the opinion even more toward their
preferred policy position (while moderating their vote to avoid a dissent on
the part of the opposite party judge). Also, judges with higher outside
citation counts, a measure of opinion-writing skill, correlate with greater
covering activity in high salience subject matter areas. Higher skill judges
are more likely to trade off their votes in a mixed panel in return for
influence on the shape of the opinion.
Part II provides a framework to assess how judges make decisions
with regard to voting and opinion writing in judicial cases, and it posits
hypotheses relating to our covering hypothesis. Part III describes our
dataset and sets forth the empirical tests and findings. Part IV discusses
implications.
II. THE CONSTRAINED ATTITUDINALIST MODEL
In deciding a case, the judges on a federal circuit court perform two
structurally separate tasks: they vote, and they produce a written opinion
explaining their reasoning consistent with the vote. Political scientists tend
to view judges as individual decisionmakers with policy preferences. Under
this model, referred to as attitudinalist, judges vote their policy
preferences. 31 The model stands in contrast to the legal model of judging,
which posits that judges decide cases based on law (for example, the
dictates of statutes and precedent). 32 The importance of the attitudinal
model rests not only in theory, but also on empirical work supporting the
claim that judges seek primarily to advance their policy preferences. 33
Nevertheless, even supporters of the attitudinalist model will likely
concede that it is an oversimplification and that judges are subject to a
variety of constraints, including precedent.34
We model judges as caring about policy preferences, consistent with
the attitudinal model.35 We also accept, however, that judges are
31. See George, supra note 5, at 1639-40, 1649-55.
32. Id.
33. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9-10 (1998).
34. E.g., Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86
AM. POL. SCI. REv. 323, 325 (1992).
35. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISTED 74-124 (2002) (discussing foundations of the attitudinal model). See
also Choi & Gulati, Citation Bias, supra note 9, at 6 (describing a constrained attitutidinalist model);
Kim, supra note 1, at 391-408 (describing a number of models that have judges constrained by
institutional, structural, and resource related factors); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court,
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constrained by both legal precedent and available resources. 36 Legal
precedent matters because judges face the possibility of review, both by the
circuit en banc and from the U.S. Supreme Court. Following precedent (as
well as influential, nonprecedential opinions) raises the likelihood that an
opinion will survive judicial review. The ability to generate new precedent,
in turn, enables a judge to affect future judicial decisions. Even when an
opinion is not directly precedential, if it is well-reasoned, it may help sway
the decisions of judges outside the circuit. Judges are also resource
constrained. Writing an effective opinion that establishes a precedent for
future decisions is time-consuming and difficult. Some judges, due to skill
and experience, may bear less of a resource cost from writing any one
opinion than other judges.
Given an attitudinal model of judging constrained by precedent and
resources, how do judges trade off votes and legal reasoning in the
opinion? After a case gets assigned to a panel and oral argument is heard
(or not), the judges go into conference where they have a brief discussion
followed by a vote. 37 Voting is a low effort and high visibility activity that
the judges do together. Each judge can see what the others are doing on this
task. Once the vote is over, assuming there are no moves to dissent by any
of the three, the case gets assigned to one of the judges to be written. In
contrast to voting, writing the opinion is a high effort and low visibility
activity.3 8 The writing judge and the judge's clerks perform the task in
isolation from the other chambers. And while the other judges can and
often do make final approval conditional on revisions to the reasoning,
making anything more than minor changes is difficult and unlikely. It
requires effort by the nonwriting judges to scrutinize the reasoning used by
the writing judge and to envision all of the possible ills from the opinion.
And given that the nonwriting judges have their own assigned cases to
write, they are unlikely to do more than minimal monitoring unless they see
119 HARV. L. REv. 31, 52 (2005) (describing justices as feeling constrained by the law in the majority
of cases before them).
36. A number of studies report that judges appear to see themselves as constrained by precedent.
See, e.g., George & Epstein, supra note 34, at 323; Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting
Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J.
POL. SC. 162 (1999); Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential
Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & SOc'Y REV.
135 (2006).
37. COFFIN, supra note 6, at 133-34 (describing how the judges take a tentative vote in
conference, after oral arguments); Richard Posner, Diary, SLATE, Jan. 15, 2002,
http://www.slate.com/id/206062 1/entry/2060742.
38. COFFIN, supra note 6, at 171-229 (describing the structure of and effort involved in opinion
writing).
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red flags. The writing judge enjoys a type of monopoly position with
respect to the crafting of the opinion.
39
Judges will vary in how much they care about voting versus
precedent. Those judges who are focused more on doing justice in the
immediate case will value votes more than the opportunity to create
precedent. Other judges, perhaps those who care more about their place in
posterity or advancing a particular ideological agenda, may care more
about producing precedent whose influence goes beyond the immediate
case. The foregoing distinction between the "outcome" judges (who care
more about the immediate effects on the litigants) and "precedent" judges
(who care more about the long-term effects of the case) sets up a situation
where trades may occur.40 Judges who care more about long-term
consequences (precedent creation) and less about the outcome in a
particular case (voting) should be willing to trade their votes for the
monopoly power over writing the opinion. Given that precedent creation-
especially long-lasting precedent-takes significant effort and comes easier
to some than others, perhaps we will see that the harder-working judges
and the ones with greater reasoning and writing skills will choose to trade
votes for the ability to write opinions in particular subject matter areas.
The plausibility of the trading scenario is strengthened when one
considers the costs of dissenting. Dissents occur where, in effect, the trade
has broken down-where judges are unwilling to compromise on a
combination of votes and writing. Here, both sides lose. The dissenter
writes an opinion with zero precedential value; apart from the personal
satisfaction of having expressed one's self, the effort is largely wasted
(although exceptions exist).41 As for the judges in the majority, they end up
having to work harder to justify their votes, and the precedent is likely
39. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 277 (2007).
40. On the "professional" versus "politician" dichotomy, see generally Stephen J. Choi, G Mitu.
Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected
Rather Than Appointed Judiciary (Aug. 22, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssm.com/abstractid= 1008989).
41. See CROSS, supra note 4, at 160-61. On the rare occasion, however, when hindsight shows a
judge's dissent to have possessed an unusual strength of principle (or, cynically, foresight about societal
developments), the dissent, largely because it is a dissent, can far outstrip the majority opinion in terms
of influence and authority. Included in this small subset of canonical dissents are Justice Harlan's
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) and Justice Holmes's dissent in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905). See Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical
Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 788-90, 800-01 (2000). At the circuit court level, however, the
likelihood of a dissent achieving such canonical status is probably smaller.
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weakened because of the uncertainty created by the dissent. 42 There is also
the heightened possibility of en banc review or the grant of certiorari due to
the red flag of a dissent. The point is that both sides have an incentive to
compromise to avoid a dissent.43 Given those incentives, it should not be
surprising to see relatively few dissenting opinions.
Four predictions result:
(1) We should see a subset of cases where judges of different
political persuasions vote together, but where the compromise
on votes is balanced by greater bias in reasoning. In other
words, the judge who compromises a vote has bargained for
the right to reason in a fashion that the judge individually
prefers. The judge's more visible vote acts as a cover for the
judge's less visible and more partisan legal reasoning.
(2) Trades-which result in more moderate votes and more
partisan reasoning-are more likely to occur in cases
involving politically salient issues where judges often hold
divergent values, thereby creating more room for the trading
of votes for reasoning. Conversely, in areas not involving
salient issues, we are unlikely to see trades; likely, the judges
will agree.
(3) Trades are more likely in cases involving judges of different
skill levels. When judges skilled at producing lasting
precedent are sitting with judges lacking those skills, we
should see the former trade their votes for the control of the
reasoning. Court norms may prohibit a judge from writing too
many opinions relative to other judges. Nonetheless, we
should still see a shift in the mix of cases for judges-with
precedent judges taking on more cases in top salient subject
matter areas where they may employ partisan reasoning.
(4) Mixed panels where the authoring judge is writing against two
others of a different party should have lower bias than mixed
42. See KLEIN, supra note 7, at 83 (stating that opinions with dissents generally have weaker
precedential value).
43. Cross acknowledges this possibility, explaining that "[tihe majority might be willing to make
some compromises, at least in opinion language, to avoid provoking the minority into one of the rare
dissents." CROSS, supra note 4, at 160. See also Christopher A. Bracey, Louis Brandeis and the Race
Question, 52 ALA. L. REV. 859, 867 (2001) ("In addition to writing powerful dissenting opinions,
[Justice] Brandeis frequently used the threat of dissent to temper an otherwise unacceptable majority
opinion."); Corley, supra note 25, at 157 (suggesting that the threat of a concurrence can also be
significant sanction).
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panels where the writing judge is writing against one judge of
the same party and one of the other party. If there are trades,
the writing judge presumably has lower bargaining power if
the judge is writing against two judges from the other party
than if the judge has one colleague from the same party.
In sum, the hypothesis is that judges sometimes engage in a form of
covering; they pretend to go in one direction (via voting), but in actuality
push in a different direction (via reasoning). This Article tests whether
covering takes place in opinions involving mixed panels.
Our predictions follow a strand of scholarship, albeit focused on the
Supreme Court, which also points to the possibility of trading votes for
control over reasoning.44 This literature looks at the relationship between
ideology and the assignment of opinions to specific authoring Justices (and
the key role that the Chief Justice plays in this assignment).45 The Justice
who is assigned the task of writing the opinion is seen as gaining a measure
of agenda control. Typically, the assumption is that, if the case involves
important issues, the Chief Justice (or other senior Justice, if the Chief
Justice is in the minority) will use the power of assignment to give the
opinion to the Justice whose ideology is closest to that favored by the Chief
44. E.g., THOMAS H. HAMMOND, CHRIS W. BONNEAU & REGINALD S. SHEEHAN, STRATEGIC
BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 139-214 (2005); FORREST MALTZMAN,
JAMES F. SPRIGGS, II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE
COLLEGIAL GAME 29-93 (2000). On the importance of chiefjudge control of opinion assignment in the
state high courts, see generally Laura Langer et al., Recrnitment of Chief Justices on State Supreme
Courts: A Choice Between Institutional and Personal Goals, 65 J. POL. 656 (2003). The observation
that opinion assignment can be a key strategic element goes back at least to Walter Murphy's classic
work. See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964). The foregoing is in
addition to the literature on strategic voting itself, where judges trade votes or modify their votes in
anticipation of the behavior of other actors. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting
Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2298-99 (1999).
45. E.g., BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
65 (1979) (reporting that Chief Justice Burger would often not assign the opinions in key cases
involving civil rights, criminal law, and free speech to his ideological enemies (Marshall, Brennan, and
Douglas) and assigned them instead the lame opinions in areas such as tax). See also MALTZMAN ET
AL., supra note 44, at 29-56 (describing the strategic element in opinion assignment). For earlier studies
looking at the Warren Court, see David W. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority
Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 652, 677-78 (1972) (looking
at assignment patterns in civil rights cases). But see Gregory James Rathjen, Policy Goals, Strategic
Choice, and Majority Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Replication, 18 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 713, 719 (1974) (calling into question Rohde's primary hypothesis based on examination of
economic cases decided by the Warren Court). Recent research has moved beyond the strategic moves
of the Chief Justice to additionally examining other Justices such as the Senior Justice in the minority
group. See Tobias T. Gibson & Matthew M. Schneider, Repositioning for Power: The Third Position of
Influence on the U.S. Supreme Court (Dec. 19, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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Justice.46 The Chief Justice, however, may switch strategies if the coalition
is fragile-that is, if there is a risk that a marginal Justice might change his
vote. The Chief Justice might instead give control of the opinion to the
Justice who looks to be closest to the margin, so that the swing Justice can
craft the opinion in a fashion that keeps the Justice from changing her
vote.47 In effect, it is in this second situation where a trade typically occurs.
The swing Justice is given control of the opinion in exchange for his vote.48
Chief Justice Burger's tendency to cast occasional "phony" votes in favor
of outcomes that he did not desire, so as to gain control of opinion
assignment, is another example of trading.
49
At the circuit court level, the equivalent power of assignment is
typically in the hands of the senior judge on the panel. But, unlike the
Supreme Court, which has control over its docket, the assignment power
itself is not as important to the circuit courts because the courts sit in
panels, and there is generally a large docket that needs to be shared. Thus,
judges are forced to cooperate, and the importance of hierarchy is
diminished. The key factor that leads to trading is that writing opinions is
effort-intensive. 50  Judges are resource-constrained and have different
46. See, e.g., WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 45, at 64-65.
47. See Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Majority Opinion Assignment and the Maintenance of
the Original Coalition on the Warren Court, 32 AM. J. POL. So. 72, 73-80 (1988); David J. Danelski,
The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court, in THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM: READINGS IN PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR 506 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds.,
1978); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Opinion Assignment on the Rehnquist Court, 89
JUDICATURE 121, 126 (2005); Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion
Assignment, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1754-55 (2006) (stating that in order to preserve a fragile
coalition, opinions might be assigned to Justices in the ideological center rather than at the extreme).
Even here, as Toobin explains, using Justice Stevens's choice of Justice Breyer to write the opinion in
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), rather than Justice O'Connor, there are complex strategic
choices to be made. Justice O'Connor might have been the shakiest Justice in the coalition, but Justice
Stevens assigned the opinion to Justice Breyer because, as Toobin explains it, Justice Breyer had the
political skills to keep his senior colleagues on board, whereas with Justice O'Connor, there was the
danger that she would find that the opinion "wouldn't write." JEFFREY TOOBtN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE
SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 132-34 (2007).
48. See Brenner & Spaeth, supra note 47, at 74 ("[T]he opinion assignment can be perceived as a
tacit bargain in which the assigner awards the opinion to the assignee on the understanding that the
assignee will remain in the original coalition."); David W. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice, and
Majority Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 AM. J. POL. SCI. 652, 654 (1972)
(referring to the majority opinion as a "side payment" to a Justice "to induce him to ... remain in a
majority opinion").
49. See Timothy Johnson et al., Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 349, 351 (2005). See also MURPHY, supra note 44, at 84-85 (discussing the
possibility of phony votes even prior to the Burger Court); Dahlia Lithwick, Talk About Your Overrated
Job: Why Would Anyone Want to Be Chief Justice?, SLATE, Nov. 16, 2004, http://slate.com/id/210 9807
(describing the foregoing).
50. These assumptions about costs form the basis of the bargaining model in the recent article by
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preferences and abilities. These differences create room for bargains. If the
foregoing is correct, then we should see trading votes for agenda control
occurring at the circuit court level as well.
III. EMPIRICAL TESTS
The dataset consists of judicial opinions authored by federal circuit
court judges from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 1999, as obtained from
a study from 2004 by the authors ("2004 Choi and Gulati study").5 In
assessing citations we constrained our sample to federal circuit court judges
still active (and not senior status) as of May 2003, when we started to
compile the data.52 Judges near retirement may engage in different citation
practices. Judges near retirement may not care as much about their
reputations as newer judges do or about the effect of reversals on their
possibility of promotion (to the Supreme Court). Judges near retirement
may also not benefit as much as younger judges from fostering long-term
relationships with judges of similar ideology or other judges that cite back
to them frequently.
Our constraint leaves us with opinions from a total of ninety-eight
judges. Starting from the 2004 Choi and Gulati study, we examined each
opinion and coded citations from the set of ninety-eight active judges back
to one of the ninety-eight judges in our sample. We impose these
constraints for two reasons. First, judges likely pay attention to citations
from other active judges who provide the prospect of future reciprocal
citations. Only citations to active judges pose this possibility. Further, it is
likely that more recent cases provide the fullest description of the current
law. Cases from several decades earlier likely receive citations only when
there is no more recent treatment of the issue or where the case itself has
become canonical (a rare occurrence for cases).53
Second, limiting our sample to the ninety-eight active judges (and
their citations back to opinions authored by one of the ninety-eight judges)
allows us to control the pool of opinions available for citation (that is,
whether the pool of opinions is more Republican or Democrat judge
authored). A judge may cite more frequently to Republican-authored
Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles Cameron. See Lax & Cameron, supra note 39, at 279.
51. For a description of the dataset, see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next
Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 23 (2004).
52. To ensure a full two years of opinion data for each judge, we also excluded judges appointed
after January I, 1998.
53. Canonical cases present the additional complication that the analytical propositions that they
stand for may become so well accepted that the authoring judge is not cited any more for it.
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opinions simply because the pool of past opinions is relatively more
Republican-authored. We assume that because the opinions written by the
active judges are relatively recent, they have an equal chance of citation-
absent bias. In contrast, if we were to look at citations to any opinion
generally, we would lack a control pool against which to assess the citation
pattern. Prior research tells us that the probability that a particular opinion
will get cited depreciates over time.54 Including data for judges from more
than a few decades prior would require us to make depreciation
adjustments for judges of different vintages. By using only active judges,
we avoid these adjustments in developing a control for the pool of available
opinions. Although opinions among active judges are not all equal, the
differences are less than if we were to include past judges or senior judges.
From the 2004 dataset, we started with published opinions authored in
1998 and 1999, excluding the year 2000 due to resource constraints. 55 For
the 6,348 opinions from the dataset that were authored in 1998 and 1999,
we hand coded citations contained in each opinion, recording all citations
to an opinion authored by one of the ninety-eight federal circuit court
judges in our sample. We coded whether a judge cited to judges of the
same or the opposite political party as the citing judge, using the party of
the president who nominated a judge as a proxy for the judge's political
affiliation. For purposes of our empirical tests, we defined Mixed Panel as
equal to one (1) if at least one judge is of the opposite party as the
authoring judge and zero (0) otherwise; Unified Panel is equal to one (1) if
all judges on the panel are of the same political party and zero (0)
otherwise.
We limit our analysis to outside circuit citations in majority opinions,
leaving us with 2,514 opinions with at least one outside citation to a sample
judge. Citations to judges within the same circuit, we assume, are more
likely to be driven by the dictates of precedent than outside circuit citations.
Focusing on outside citations puts the spotlight on opinions where judges
have the greatest discretion in their citation practice. The fact that the
choice to make an outside citation is discretionary suggests two things.
First, for the most part, these citations will likely show up more when the
issues are important or of first impression. 56 In other words, they will
54. Bhattacharya & Smyth, supra note 9, at 236-40; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 255, 262-70 (1976);
Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law 12-27 (San Diego Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 06-11, 2005),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=642863.
55. Together with several research assistants, we spent over two years collecting the data for this
Article.
56. Rorie Spill Solberg, Jolly A. Emrey & Susan B. Haire, Inter-Court Dynamics and the
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appear where there is no internal circuit precedent that controls the
outcome. Second, because judges tend to cite opinions from outside courts
only in select circumstances, such citations are unlikely to be routine or pro
forma citations (such as the boilerplate string cites that judges might cut
and paste for matters such as the standard of review 57).
We do not use our data to analyze voting patterns. Instead, we take as
given the findings of the Cross and Tiller, Revesz, and Sunstein and his
coauthors, studies that judges moderate their voting when sitting on mixed
panels and demonstrate high bias on unified panels. 58 We do this because it
enables us to keep our analysis objective-analyzing whether a particular
vote was pro-Republican or pro-Democrat would have required us either to
engage in subjective guessing as to what constituted a pro-Republican or
pro-Democrat viewpoint or to use a rough approximation, such as saying
that all pro-government agency decisions were pro-Democrat, for instance.
The downside is that we are open to the criticism that juxtaposing our
results on judicial reasoning against the results from the prior studies on
voting might be inaccurate. For example, maybe if voting patterns were
analyzed for the cases in our dataset, we might not find the vote moderating
panel effects that others have found. The robustness of their findings,
which hold across multiple studies by multiple researchers, however,
caused us to focus our energies on analyzing reasoning patterns and taking
vote moderation as a given as opposed to second-guessing the prior
findings on voting patterns.
Table 1 reports summary statistics on our sample.
Development of Legal Policy: Citation Patterns in the Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 34
POL'Y STUD. J. 277, 289 (2006).
57. See generally KLEIN, supra note 7. Another technique to separate out the "strong" citations
from "string" or otherwise weak citations is to count only those citations accompanied by an explicit
discussion of the case or a quote from it. Solberg et al., supra note 56, at 283; Walsh, supra note 28, at
342. Each of these techniques, though, is likely to be both under and overinclusive in terms of sorting
strong from weak citations.
58. See generally SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16; Cross & Tiller, supra note 14; Revesz, supra
note 15.
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TABLE 1. Summary statistics.
1998 1999
CIRCUIT NUMBER OF PERCENT NUMBER OF PERCENT
COURT OPINIONS OF TOTAL OPINIONS OF TOTAL
l 95 7.61 108 8.54
2 77 6.16 52 4.11
3 70 5.60 77 6.09
4 87 6.97 94 7.43
5 151 12.09 153 12.09
6 76 6.08 99 7.83
7 224 17.93 225 17.79
8 88 7.05 82 6.48
9 89 7.13 85 6.72
10 118 9.45 130 10.28
11 105 8.41 109 8.62
DC 69 5.52 51 4.03
TOTAL 1249 100.0 1265 100.1
Pearson chi2(10)= 12.878 Pr 0.301
For each opinion we calculated the number of outside circuit citations
by the authoring judge to a judge of the opposite party divided by the total
number of outside circuit citations to one of the ninety-eight judges in our
sample (defined as OppositeParty).59 Neither the number of judges nor
59. The following is an example of our coding: Circuit Judge Boudin wrote the majority opinion
for Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1998). We looked through the opinion, coding for
citations to any of our set of ninety-eight active federal circuit court judges. In the opinion, Judge
Boudin cited one judge outside of the First Circuit from our set of ninety-eight judges: Judge Luttig of
the Fourth Circuit. See id. at 47 (citing Dimeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 805-06 (4th Cir. 1995)). Both
Judge Boudin and Judge Luttig were appointed by a Republican president. We therefore treated Judge
Boudin's citation of Judge Luttig as a same-party-outside-circuit citation.
We also limited our analysis to published opinions. As Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and Schwab discuss,
omitting unpublished opinions excludes a substantial universe of judge-authored opinions. See Orley
Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of
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the number of opinions written by the judges is equally divided between
Republicans and Democrats. A judge may cite more frequently to
Republican judge-written opinions because a greater fraction of the pool of
past opinions came from Republican judges.
As a control, we calculated the "pool" of available outside circuit
opinions. First, we started with a particular judge (for example, Judge
Lynch of the First Circuit). Second, we identified the judges in our set of
ninety-eight who are outside circuit judges (for example, all judges in our
sample who are outside the First Circuit). Third, for each outside circuit
judge, we tabulated the total number of opinions written prior to 1998, the
start of our dataset. Last, we calculated the number of opinions written by
judges of the opposite political party divided by the total pool of opinions
written by all outside circuit judges in our sample prior to 1998 (defined as
OppositePool). If judges were to cite randomly to outside circuit court
judges, the OppositePool fraction would represent the baseline fraction of
outside circuit opinions to judges of the opposite political party available to
be cited.
Table 2 reports a means comparison between Opposite-Party and
Opposite-Pool for all opinions in our sample.
TABLE 2. Fraction of outside circuit citations to opposite party judges
relative to the pool of opinions.
N Opposite Party Opposite Pool p-value
ALL OPINIONS 2514 0.423 0.438 0.0262
p-value is for a t-test of the difference in means between OppositeParty and Opposite-Pool.
Table 2 suggests that authoring judges cite less to opposite party
judges than to same party judges. The mean fraction of outside circuit
citations to opposite party judges is lower than the pool of available outside
circuit opinions (difference significant at the 5% confidence level).
The next question is whether the tendency of judges to cite to judges
of the opposite political party varies depending on the subject matter of the
Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 263-64 (1995). On the other hand, if
judges do act with an ideological bias, we expect this bias to appear where ideology matters the most:
published opinions that affect the development of precedent. Unpublished opinions, in contrast, provide
judges with little ability to affect the development of the law. See id.
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opinion.6" For more salient, higher stakes cases, judges may have an
increased propensity to decide along party lines. An opinion dealing with a
civil rights issue may result in an increased level of partisanship compared
to an opinion dealing with a private contract law issue. To examine whether
subject matter determines citation practices, we categorize our opinions
into eighteen categories plus an "Other" category for opinions we do not
specifically categorize (a total of nineteen categories). Descriptions of each
subject matter category appear in Appendix B.
Sunstein and his coauthors found that ideological effects in judicial
voting patterns were stronger for certain categories of cases, including
politically heated subject matter areas like civil rights. 61 Our goal was to
test for the presence of subject area effects in citation data. Sunstein and his
coauthors used fourteen categories of cases including abortion, capital
punishment, piercing the corporate veil, campaign finance, affirmative
action, and federalism.
For two reasons, we modified the Sunstein categorization. First, our
dataset was constructed to capture the full range of cases decided by active
federal appellate court judges over the 1998 to 1999 period. That produced
a larger number of subject areas than what Sunstein and his coauthors
explored, particularly in the area of private law. We therefore included
subject matter categories for a variety of private law areas, including
Private Law (contracts, creditor versus debtor, and so on), Intellectual
Property, Tax, Federal Business Law (securities regulation, bankruptcy,
and so on), and Torts. Second, because we looked specifically at a two-year
period, there were certain areas, such as abortion, where we did not have
enough cases to conduct a meaningful analysis. We therefore had to
broaden the size of our subject matter categories beyond those of Sunstein
and his coauthors. For example, we combined all the cases involving civil
rights, including abortion cases, into a single Rights category, whereas
Sunstein and his coauthors had six separate categories of civil rights cases
(affirmative action, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, Title VII,
disability, and abortion). A breakdown of our subject matter categories is
also provided in Appendix B.62
60. See Choi & Gulati, Citation Bias, supra note 9, at 11-13 (hypothesizing that such a tendency
exists).
61. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting, supra note 19, at 305-06.
62. One complication in comparison to the Sunstein dataset has to do with the inadequate
number of cases in the abortion and capital punishment areas in our database. Sunstein and his
coauthors found that the patterns of moderated voting in a number of salient areas do not show up in a
couple of the most salient areas (abortion and capital punishment), where the suggestion is that private
policy preferences are so strong that there is no moderated voting. Id. at 327-28. Maybe what we would
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The next step was to find an exogenous method of determining which
subject areas were high-stakes areas with political salience for circuit court
judges. For that, we followed a study by Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal in
focusing on news stories relating to the U.S. Supreme Court on the front
page of the New York Times. 63 We assumed that issues receiving the most
attention in the context of the Supreme Court were likely politically salient
from a circuit court judge's point of view. We examined the New York
Times front page articles from the period between January 1, 1993, and
December 31, 1997 .64 By examining this time period, the four years
preceding the commencement of our dataset, we were able to canvass those
issues most salient to judges at the time. This time period included two
nominations and confirmations to the Court (Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer), raising the likelihood that articles within the time period discussed
issues most salient to the selection of Justices to the Court. We skimmed
each article and counted references to our subject matter categories (that is,
if both abortion and capital punishment were mentioned in a particular
article, we counted that as one mention in the Rights category and one
mention in the Capital Punishment category). Results are reported in Table
3.
find is that trading in these areas is also reduced; however, data constraints do not permit that inquiry
here.
63. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SC. 66
(2000).
64. We searched for "supreme court" in the Westlaw NYT database and focused only on those
articles that dealt with the U.S. Supreme Court.
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TABLE 3. High-stakes issue ranking.
(Organized by number of mentions of subject areas in the New York Times front
page articles from January 1, 1993, to December 31, 1997.)
NUMBER OF MENTIONS
SUBJECT OF LAW NUMBER OF MENTIONS DIVIDED BY TOTAL
NUMBER OF OPINIONS
CHURCH AND STATE 25 1.39
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 27 1.17
FEDERALISM 15 0.94
FIRST AMENDMENT 47 0.62
RIGHTS 194 0.43
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 14 0.35
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 21 0.28
ADMINISTRATIVE 26 0.26
TAKINGS AND PROPERTY 4 0.19
TAX 12 0.18
FEDERAL BUSINESS 28 0.13
ENVIRONMENT 5 0.10
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 0.10
TORTS 9 0.09
IMMIGRATION 2 0.04
CRIMINAL 35 0.03
LABOR 10 0.03
PRIVATE 0 0.00
OTHER 13 0.12
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The category with the greatest salience was the Rights category, with
almost 200 mentions (over four times the number of mentions as the
second highest category, First Amendment). Some of our subject matter
categories span a greater body of law than others. We may have observed
more articles relating to criminal law compared with campaign finance, for
instance, because of the breadth of our definition of criminal law. To scale
each category, we divided the number of mentions by the total number of
authored opinions in our dataset for that subject matter category. Many of
the subject matter categories have only a small number of cases-for
example, there are only sixteen Federalism cases. We therefore aggregated
the subject matter categories in the top half ranked based on salience
(terming such categories together as Top Salient) and aggregated the
categories in the bottom half (Bottom Salient).65
Table 4 reports the t-test between the mean levels of OppositeParty
and OppositePool for Mixed Panel decisions involving (a) Bottom Salient
and (b) Top Salient subject matter areas.
TABLE 4.
N Opposite-Party Opposite-Pool p-value
Bottom Salient Opinions 1837 0.432 0.438 0.463
Top Salient Opinions 677 0.398 0.439 0.002
TOP SALIENT OPINIONS ONLY
N Opposite-Party Opposite-Pool p-value
Unified Panel 190 0.353 0.370 0.484
Mixed Panel 474 0.417 0.468 0.001
p-value is for a t-test of the difference in means between Opposite-Party and Opposite-Pool.
65. More formally, Top Salient is equal to one (1) if the opinion relates to one of the top half
subject matter categories in Table 3 (that is, all categories listed above "Tax") and zero (0) otherwise.
Bottom Salient is equal to one (1) if the opinion relates to one of the bottom half subject matter
categories in Table 3 (that is, all categories listed below "Takings and Property") and zero (0)
otherwise.
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Note from Table 4 that no significant tendency to avoid citation to
opposite party judges exists for decisions involving Bottom Salient subject
matter areas. On the other hand, for Top Salient subject matter area
opinions, there is a strong finding that authoring judges avoid citing
opposite party judges (difference significant at the <1% confidence level).
We tested whether the tendency to avoid citing opposite party judges is
greater for panels where all the judges are of the same party (Unified
Panel) or where judges are of different political parties (Mixed Panel).
Table 4 reports that the tendency to avoid citing opposite party judges is
significant only for a Mixed Panel involving Top Salient issues (at the <1%
level). While other scholars have found that judges on a mixed panel tend
to moderate their vote, at a summary statistic level, it looks like these
judges do not moderate their reasoning. In return for their more visible
moderation of the vote (to avoid a dissent or to obtain control over the
authorship of the opinion), authoring judges may be using their control to
craft a partisan opinion, thereby affecting the outcome of future cases.
Do Democrats act differently from Republicans? If Democratic
presidents appointed "outcome" judges and Republican presidents
appointed "precedent" judges to the courts, then there should be
differentials in the citation bias data for the judges from both parties.
(President Reagan, for example, is reputed to have focused his
appointments on judges who would have a long-lasting impact on the
creation of precedent.66) The precedent judges will be more willing to trade
votes for control of the reasoning, and the outcome judges on the other side
will often be willing to accept the trade. This should result in different
citation patterns for precedent judges, as compared to the outcome judges,
suggesting more covering. We tested whether the covering effect we
observed for judges in mixed panels applies equally to Democrat- and
Republican-appointee judges. Table 5 reports a summary statistic
comparison of Opposite Party and Opposite-Pool separately for Democrat
and Republican authoring judges on a Mixed Panel.
66. Included among President Reagan's appointments were Judges Posner, Easterbrook, Scalia,
Bork, and Winter, all of whom have had a tremendous impact on the evolution of precedent in a wide
variety of areas. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 49-50 (2001).
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TABLE 5.
DEMOCRAT
N Opposite Party Opposite Pool p-value
Bottom Salient Opinions 562 0.741 0.762 0.154
Top Salient Opinions 201 0.695 0.763 0.007
REPUBLICAN
N Opposite-Party Opposite-Pool p-value
Bottom Salient Opinions 707 0.274 0.252 0.105
Top Salient Opinions 273 0.212 0.250 0.047
p-value is for a t-test of the difference in means between OppositeParty and Opposite Pool.
From Table 5, no significant tendency appears, suggesting that
authoring judges of both parties do not avoid citing opposite party judges
for Bottom Salient opinions. A significant difference does exist for Top
Salient opinions. Both Democrat- and Republican-appointee judges are less
likely to cite to opposite party judges compared with the pool of available
opinions (difference significant at the <1% level for Democrat judges and
at the 5% level for Republican judges).
A. MIXED PANELS
We utilized an ordinary least squares model to assess the covering
hypothesis while controlling for other factors that may affect a judge's
decision to cite to particular opinions. The unit of analysis is an opinion
authored by a judge in our sample. The dependant variable is
Opposite Party, the number of citations contained in an opinion that are to
judges (in the sample of ninety-eight judges) of the opposite political party
as a fraction of the number of the citations in the opinion to any of the
sample judges. The model is (with definitions in Appendix A):
Opposite Partyi = a +filMixed Panel + 32i Top Salient
+ J33i Mixed Panel x Top Salient
+J34i Opposition-Same Party
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+ J3si OppositionOpposite Party + J 3 6i GHP
+ Zfki Controlki
+ Year Effects + Circuit Effects + ci
We included Mixed Panel to test for the effect of a mixed panel of
judges on the authoring judge's decision to cite to opposite party judges,
using Unified Panels as the base category. We included Top Salient to
assess the importance of political salience in determining the tendency of a
judge to avoid citations to opposite outside circuit party judges. The model
uses an interaction term for Mixed Panel x Top Salient to test whether
authoring judges in a mixed panel cite differently in subject areas where the
stakes are higher.
The incentive to moderate voting in a mixed panel exists primarily for
opinions where a dissent does not occur. A dissent indicates an explicit
break between panel members, and we expect to see a more polarized
pattern of citations in such situations. To assess the incentive to cite to
opinions written by judges of the same party when faced with an opposing
opinion, we included indicator variables for OppositionSame Party and
OppositionOpposite Party. OppositionSame Party is equal to one (1) if a
dissent exists and involves a judge of the same political party and zero (0)
otherwise. Opposition Opposite Party is equal to one (1) if the opposition
opinion involves a judge of the opposite political party and zero (0)
otherwise.
We also included a continuous measure of a judge's ideology obtained
from research conducted by Micheal Giles, Virginia Hettinger, and Todd
Peppers (the GHP Score).67 GHP Score is based on the ideological
preferences of the appointing president and home-state senators and ranges
from -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative). The GHP Score is
correlated with whether a judge is Republican (correlation coefficient =
0.8534) and provides a continuous analog to our binary classification of
judges as either Democrat or Republican.
Our model included a number of control variables specific to a judge
that may affect the incidence of citations to other party judges. We included
Opposite-Pool to control for the pool of past opinions to which a judge
may cite. We included the log of the years of experience of the specific
67. See Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A
Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. REs. Q. 623, 630-32 (2001) (measuring
judicial preference based on ideological scores of the president and senators involved in the
appointment process). Thanks to Stefanie Lindquist for giving us these scores.
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judge (Ln(YearExp)). Judges with more experience on the bench may
develop a stronger sense of their favored judges and cases to which to cite.
We also used an indicator variable for whether the author is the chief judge
of a particular circuit (Chief Judge). The position of chief judge may lead
judges to take a more neutral posture in their citation practices.
A control for the independence of the judge is also included
(Independence). We expected judges who are generally skewed toward
their own political end of the spectrum to exhibit this bias in their citation
practices. The measure of independence is from the 2004 dataset by Choi
and Gulati. In that study, we obtained the percentage of opposing opinions
(that is, a dissent against a majority and a majority against a dissent
opinion) where a particular judge wrote an opposing opinion against the
opinion of a judge of the same political party (Actual Same Party Opposing
Fraction). For each judge, we determined the political party (as proxied by
the party of the appointing president) of the other active judges on each
circuit from 1998 to 2000 (including those who eventually took senior
status or retired), obtaining the baseline percentage of same-party judges on
the circuit (Predicted Same Party Opposing Fraction). If a judge opposes
other judges on the same circuit at random, we posit that the Actual Same
Party Opposing Fraction should equal the Predicted Same Party Opposing
Fraction. Independence is defined as equal to Actual Same Party Opposing
Fraction minus the Predicted Same Party Opposing Fraction. A negative
number under the 2004 Choi and Gulati dataset for the Independence
measure indicates a judge who avoids taking opposite positions from
judges of the same political party.
We also control for differences related to the year of the opinion and
the circuit in which the authoring judge sits (Year-Fixed Effects and
Circuit-Fixed Effects). Model 1 of Table 6 reports the results from our
model.
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TABLE 6. Judge citation model.
VARIABLES MODEL I MODEL 2
MixedPanel 0.039** 0.034**
(2.060) (1.750)
Mixed Panel x Top Salient -0.056* -0.058*
(-1.640) (-1.680)
Opposition-Same Party -0.018 -0.031
(-0.480) (-0.800)
Opposition-Opposite Party -0.078*** -0.074***
(-2.880) (-2.690)
Top Salient 0.005 0.007
(0.180) (0.250)
GHP 0.007
(0.180)
Opposite-Pool 0.902
(14.190)
Ln(YearExp) -0.011
(-0.750)
Chief Judge -0.014
(-0.550)
Independence -0.020
(-0.450)
Constant 0.051 0.428***
(0.970) (24.370)
Judge-Fixed Effects No Yes
Circuit-Fixed Effects Yes No
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N
2462 2462
Adj R2Adj 0.3068 0.3068
Dependent variable is OppositeParty. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-
White robust standard errors. Variable definitions appear in Appendix A.
* 10% confidence level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.
HeinOnline -- 81 S. Cal. L. Rev.  763 2007-20082
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White
robust standard errors. Note from Model 1 that the coefficient on Mixed
Panel is positive and significant at the 5% level. Authoring judges who
face at least one judge of the opposite party on the panel tend to moderate
their tendency toward biased citations compared with the base category of
Unified Panels. Our covering hypothesis therefore does not hold for mixed
panels in Bottom Salient opinions. The coefficient on Mixed Panel x Top
Salient, in contrast, is negative and significant at the 10% level. The sum of
Top Salient + Mixed Panel x Top Salient is negative and significant at the
<1% level. Authoring judges on a Mixed Panel tend to avoid citing
opposite party judges for Top Salient opinions relative to their citation
patterns for opposite party judges in Bottom Salient opinions-in other
words, they engage in covering.68 What explains why judges on a Mixed
Panel tend to act more partisan for Top Salient opinions but less partisan
for Bottom Salient opinions? Perhaps another dimension of trading occurs
across opinions. Judges with leverage may be willing to moderate their
reasoning for nonsalient opinions (where the judges care less) in return for
the ability to write more partisan opinions in Top Salient opinions. 69 Note
that the coefficient on Top Salient alone is not significantly different from
zero. We do not observe the same differential in citation practices between
Top Salient and Bottom Salient opinions for Unified Panels.
We also see that a strong indicator of bias in citations exists where
there is a dissent from a member of the opposing party. The presence of a
dissent indicates disagreement, and when that disagreement is from
someone across the party line, it likely indicates a conflict along policy
lines; this in turn should be reflected in reasoning along policy lines.
Consistent with our summary statistic finding on the lack of difference
between Republican and Democrat judges (as seen in Table 5), Table 6
reports that the coefficient on the GHP Score variable is not significantly
different from zero. 70
68. On the other hand, the sum of Mixed Panel + Top Salient + Mixed Panel x Top Salient is not
significantly different from zero. The level of partisanship for a Mixed Panel in a Top Salient opinion is
not appreciably different from the level of partisanship in a Unified Panel.
69. Such a trade need not be explicit. Rather, a particular judge may not wish to antagonize
different party judges more than necessary and view moderation in reasoning for some opinions (the
Bottom Salient opinions) as giving them more leeway to use more partisanship in other opinions (the
Top Salient opinions) while maintaining collegiality with the different party judges.
70. As a robustness check, we added interaction terms for Mixed Panels x GHP and Mixed
Panels x Top Salient x GHP to see if more conservative judges would display different citation patterns
for mixed panels generally, and mixed panels dealing with cases in Top Salient subject matter areas.
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As a robustness check, we omitted authoring judge-specific variables
(GHP Score, Top Salient x GHP, OppositePool, Ln(YearExp), Chief
Judge, and Independence). We also omitted Circuit-Fixed Effects and
instead included Judge-Fixed Effects in the model, reported as Model 2 in
Table 6. We obtained the same qualitative results as in Model 1.
Our initial multivariate tests provided (limited) evidence that covering
may take place for Top Salient decisions. We recall from prior studies that
judges on mixed panels moderate their vote.7 1 Our finding supports the
view that while votes are moderated to build a coalition with opposite party
judges, the authoring judges trade off their votes for the ability to adjust the
opinion in their own partisan favor.
B. PANEL COMPOSITION AND BARGAINING LEVERAGE
If our covering hypothesis is correct, we should observe that the types
of trades that occur differ depending on the bargaining leverage of the
authoring judge. On panels where judges are of mixed political parties, the
authoring judge may need to trade her vote to secure the right to author a
unanimous majority opinion. The authoring judge will have greater
bargaining leverage when the other two judges consist of one judge of the
same party and one of the opposite party (an All Mixed panel). Where the
other two judges are of the opposite party (an All Opposition panel), the
authoring judge will have less leverage.
All things being equal, judges with greater leverage should have the
ability to strike relatively better deals. Even though the preferences of
opposite party judges must be taken into account in deciding the voting
outcome of the case, where the authoring judge has bargaining leverage, we
posit that the judge will shift the reasoning of the opinion toward the
authoring judge's own political disposition.
To test the importance of All Mixed and All Opposition types of mixed
panels, we employed the same model as in Table 6 with the use of separate
All Mixed and All Opposition indicator variables and All Mixed x Top
Salient and All Opposition x Top Salient interaction terms, using Unified
Panels as the base category. Table 7 reports our results.
Not reported, we found that the coefficients on both of these interaction terms were not significantly
different from zero.
71. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text (reviewing evidence of vote moderation on
the part of judges from judge panels of mixed political persuasion).
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TABLE 7. Judge citation model by judge type and panel type.
VARIABLES MODEL I MODEL 2
All Mixed
All Mixedx Top Salient
All Opposition
All Opposition x Top Salient
Opposition Same Party
Opposition-Opposite Party
Top Salient
Constant
0.042**
(2.120)
-0.069*
(-1.910)
0.033
(1.380)
-0.029
(-0.670)
-0.017
(-0.450)
-0.078***
(-2.880)
0.005
(0.180)
0.051
(0.960)
0.037*
(1.780)
-0.069*
(-1.870)
0.029
(1.180)
-0.037
(-0.810)
-0.030
(-0.770)
-0.074***
(-2.700)
0.007
(0.250)
0.428***
(24.370)
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Circuit-Fixed Effects Yes No
Judge-Fixed Effects No Yes
Judge Controls Yes No
N 2462 2462
Ad R2 0.3065 0.3064
Dependent variable is Opposite-Party. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-
White robust standard errors. Unreported, Judge Controls include GHP, Opposite-Pool, Ln(YearExp),
Chief Judge, and Independence. Variable definitions appear in Appendix A.
* 10% confidence level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.
Table 7 supports the view that judges with greater bargaining leverage
in mixed panels of judges use this leverage to adjust the opinion's
reasoning toward their own partisan position, engaging in covering. In
particular, note that the coefficient on All Mixed x Top Salient is negative
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and significant at the 10% level. The sum of Top Salient and All Mixed x
Top Salient, moreover, is negative and significant at the <1% level. Judges
on an All Mixed panel, indicating greater bargaining power, are more likely
to skew the reasoning of an opinion in a politically partisan manner for Top
Salient relative to Bottom Salient areas.72 By contrast, we do not observe
such a differential for a Unified Panel (whether All Opposition or the base
category of Unified Panels).7 3
As an additional robustness check, we omitted authoring judge-
specific variables (GHP Score, Top Salient x GHP, OppositePool,
Ln(YearExp), Chief Judge, and Independence). We also omitted Circuit-
Fixed Effects and instead included Judge-Fixed Effects in the model,
reported as Model 2 in Table 7. We obtained similar qualitative results as
in Model 1. The coefficient on All Mixed x Top Salient is negative and
significant at the 10% level. An F-test of the sum of Top Salient and All
Mixed x Top Salient rejects the null hypothesis that the sum is equal to zero
at the <1% level.
C. HIGH-CITATION JUDGES
To assess whether certain types of judges prefer to act as precedent
judges as opposed to outcome judges, we constructed a proxy for the
"quality" of circuit court judges in our sample. We use the number of
outside circuit citations each judge in our sample received for opinions
authored by the judge from 1998 to 2000 as a measure of that judge's
quality. We deem judges who receive a higher number of outside circuit
citations as higher quality than those judges who receive a lower number.
We divided our judges based on whether the judge's number of outside
citations is greater (High-Citation judge) or less than or equal to the median
(Low-Citation judge).
Our use of outside citations as a measure of judicial influence
comports with the methodology of several other studies.74 On the other
hand, limitations exist in relying on outside citations to measure quality.
75
72. On the other hand, the sum of All Mixed + Top Salient + All Mixed x Top Salient is not
significantly different from zero. The level of partisanship for an All Mixed panel in a Top Salient
opinion is not appreciably different from the level of partisanship in a Unified Panel.
73. The sum of Top Salient and All Opposition x Top Salient is not significantly different from
zero-indicating no difference between Top Salient and Bottom Salient opinions for All Opposition
panels. The coefficient on Top Salient alone is not significantly different from zero, indicating no
difference between Top Salient and Bottom Salient opinions for Unified Panels (the base category).
74. See, e.g, Gregory A. Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83
(1983); Rodney L. Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 AM. POL. SE. REV. 295 (1936).
75. See Landes et al., supra note 9, at 272-73.
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In particular, as discussed earlier, some citations occur not because the
cited opinion is the "best" decision in some abstract sense, but rather
because the citing judge is biased toward the ideological position of the
cited opinion.7 6 Our measure, nonetheless, simply divides judges into two
groups based on outside citation count and is therefore less susceptible to
these limitations. For example, even if a portion of Judge Posner's many
outside citations are suspect due to political bias in citations, his large
number of citations makes it likely he will still remain classified as a High-
Citation judge. 77
We posit that High-Citation judges are more likely to act as precedent
judges. High-Citation judges typically have a greater aptitude in crafting
well-reasoned opinions. Such judges may also have a stronger preference to
use opinions to influence future precedent and may therefore be more
willing to trade their votes with other judges in return for the ability to
write a unanimous majority opinion (and affect the opinion's reasoning).
The high rate of citation to these judges' opinions is evidence of their
aptitude and preference to create opinions that others will cite.
As a multivariate test of the difference in tendency to trade votes for
the ability to write the opinion (and affect the opinion's reasoning) between
High-Citation and Low-Citation judges, we employ the same model as in
Table 7. This model utilizes separate All Mixed and All Opposition
indicator variables for the subset of High-Citation judges and Low-Citation
opinion authoring judges (All Mixed-High-Citation Judge, All Opposite-
High-Citation Judge, All Mixed-Low-Citation Judge, All Opposition-Low-
Citation Judge)-using Unified Panels with all judges from the same party
as the base case. 78 Table 8 reports our results.
76. See Choi & Gulati, Citation Bias, supra note 9, at Part IV. 1.
77. Of course, judges at the margin may shift between the High-Citation and Low-Citation
classification of judges under more nuanced, neutral measures of citation counts. Nonetheless, for the
majority of nonmarginal judges (such as Judge Posner), the classifications of High-Citation and Low-
Citation are unlikely to change even when taking into account flaws in citation counts.
78. As a robustness test, we also included a separate indicator variable for High-Citation Judge
to allow us to distinguish between Unified Panels with a High-Citation or Low-Citation judge. The
coefficient on the High-Citation Judge indicator variable was not significantly zero and the results
remained qualitatively the same as in Table 8.
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TABLE 8. Judge citation model by j dge type and panel type.
VARIABLES MODEL
All Mixed-Hieh-Citation Judze 0.049**
(2.250)
All Mixed-High-Citation Judge -0.079**
x Top Salient (-1.970)
All Mixed-Low-Citation Judge 0.028
(0.980)
All Mixed-Low-Citation Judge -0.051
x Top Salient (-1.080)
All Opposition-High-Citation Judge 0.280
(1.020)
All Opposition-High-Citation Judge -0.006
x Top Salient (-0.120)
All Opposition-Low-Citation Judge 0.040
(1.190)
All Opposition-Low-Citation Judge -0.073
x Top Salient (-1.100)
Opposition-Same Party -0.017
(-0.450)
Opposition Opposite Party -0.078***
(-2.890)
Top Salient 0.005
(0.180)
Constant 0.052
(0.960)
Year-Fixed Effects Yes
Circuit-Fixed Effects Yes
Judge-Fixed Effects No
Judge Controls Yes
N 2462
Adj R2 0.3058
Dependent variable is Opposite Party. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-
White robust standard errors. Unreported, Judge Controls include GHP, OppositePool, Ln(YearExp),
Chief Judge, and Independence. Variable definitions appear in Appendix A.
* 10% confidence level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.
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The results from Model 1 in Table 8 are consistent with the view that
High-Citation judges will trade for the right to affect the legal reasoning of
opinions. The coefficient for All Mixed-High-Citation is positive and
significant at the 5% level. In the case of relatively low salience subject
matter areas, High-Citation judges tend to moderate the background bias
against citing opposite party judges in their opinions. However, the
coefficient on All Mixed-High Citation x Top Salient is negative with a 5%
significance level. The sum of Top Salient and All Mixed-High-Citation x
Top Salient is also negative and significant at the <1% level.79 This is
consistent with the view that High-Citation judges on an All Mixed panel
are less likely to cite opposite party judges for Top Salient areas compared
with Bottom Salient issues. The distinction between Top Salient and Bottom
Salient areas may indicate that High-Citation authoring judges are willing
to trade not only votes but also the level of partisanship in their reasoning
across subject matter areas of different salience when on All Mixed panels
(with one judge of the same party and one judge of the opposite party).80
We do not observe the same differential effect between Top Salient and
Bottom Salient opinions for any of the other panels of judges (All Mixed-
Low-Citation Judge, All Opposition-High-Citation Judge, All Opposition-
Low Citation Judge, and the base category of Unified Panels).8
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Prior research says that judges on mixed panels tend to moderate their
proclivities toward biased voting, particularly in areas involving salient
issues such as civil rights. The implication drawn from the foregoing by
some scholars is that dampening effects are at play. The views of judges
are emboldened when the judge is surrounded by like-minded individuals
but moderated when the judge is confronted with potential disagreement.
Boiled down, the model is psychological.
Building on the findings from the panel studies, but incorporating
79. We do not perform a robustness test using judge-fixed effects as the panel composition
variables of interest in Table 7 are divided based on whether a judge is a High-Citation or Low-Citation
judge, a judge-specific characteristic.
80. On the other hand, the sum of All Mixed-High-Citation Judge + Top Salient + All Mixed-
High-Citation Judge x Top Salient is not significantly different from zero. The level of partisanship for
High-Citation judges authoring an opinion for an All Mixed panel dealing with a Top Salient subject is
not appreciably different from the level of partisanship in a Unified Panel.
81. The sum of Top Salient and All Mixed-Low-Citation x Top Salient is not significantly
different from zero. The sum of Top Salient and All Opposition-High-Citation x Top Salient is not
significantly different from zero. The sum of Top Salient and All Opposition-Low-Citation x Top Salient
is not significantly different from zero. Lastly, Top Salient alone is not significantly different from zero.
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results from the analysis of reasoning patterns, our research suggests a
different dynamic at work. We find that mixed panels produce a small
(statistically insignificant) reduction in bias in reasoning for cases
involving less salient issues. So, in the less important cases, judges are
moderating not only their votes, but also their reasoning. But for mixed
panels with salient issues, the pattern is reversed. Contrary to the
predictions in the panel effects literature, we see significant bias in citation
practices. The judges on these mixed panels may be moderating their votes
even in cases involving the more salient issues, as Sunstein and others have
found, but their reasoning patterns become more biased.
Additionally, bargaining leverage is important. In situations where an
authoring judge is on a mixed panel in a Top Salient area, we find that
authoring judges with more bargaining leverage (due to the presence of
another same party judge on the panel) are better able to skew the opinion's
reasoning toward their ideologically preferred point. We also find that the
level of citation bias and thus covering in judicial reasoning is greatest in
mixed panels where the authoring judge is a High-Citation judge. High-
Citation judges care more about the opinion's reasoning and thus may be
willing to trade their vote for the right to author the opinion, particularly for
Top Salient subject matter areas. The results are consistent with a trading
model-that, in cases involving salient issues, judges may moderate their
votes to induce opposite party judges to join their voting position, but will
do so only in exchange for the ability to modify the opinion's reasoning to
suit their policy preferences.
Returning to the "Does law matter?" question posed earlier, the fact
that trades might be occurring suggests an answer in the affirmative. If
judges did not care about the creation of precedent and cared only about
votes, then they would not be willing to trade their votes for control of the
reasoning. But the results suggest that they are willing to trade; they care
about control of the precedent enough that they are willing to trade their
votes for it.
One of our results is perplexing. We found no bias in reasoning for
unified panels where all three judges are of the same political party. Our
hypothesis had been that there would not be a significant amount of
dampening in reasoning bias even where there was dampening in vote bias.
But we had still assumed that there would be a significant amount of bias
when judges were on a unified panel, where they did not face any barrier to
reasoning and were voting in an ideologically biased fashion. But what we
found is that judges on unified panels do not appear to reason in a biased
fashion, even though, based on the findings from prior studies, we assume
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that they are voting in a biased fashion. Perhaps this shows that while
judges care about creating precedent, they care more about voting. And
when they have the votes to decide the case in a biased fashion, they are
not as concerned with precedent creation. Alternatively, judges on unified
panels might not feel compelled to explain the biased precedent that they
are creating with reference to prior decisions. After all, on a mixed panel,
the failure to explain might result in a dissent by the judge from the
opposing party, who identifies the failure to adequately justify the
arguments with precedents. That, in turn, may result in embarrassment and
potentially even reversal.
To summarize, we can say with confidence that there is a need to
study not just panel effects in voting, but also in reasoning. Beyond that,
we have initial evidence suggesting that judges bargain over opinion
writing.
There is reason, however, to be cautious about our findings. Our study
takes the results of the panel effects literature as a starting point and then
looks only at citation patterns. A more detailed study could improve on our
methodology in two ways. First, it could examine both vote bias and
citation bias on the same dataset and match the trades versus vote
transactions in individual cases. Second, and more difficult, it could move
beyond using citations as a proxy for measuring bias in reasoning. Instead,
the reasoning in opinions could be coded using a textual analysis. Both
improvements bring costs, though, to the extent they inject additional
subjectivity into the analysis.
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V. APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
VARIABLE
Mixed Panel
Unified Panel
All Mixed
All Opposition
Opposite Party
DEFINITION
Indicator variable defined equal to one
(1) if at least one judge on a three-judge
federal circuit court panel is of the
opposite party as the authoring judge
and zero (0) otherwise.
Indicator variable defined equal to one
(1) if all judges on a three-judge federal
circuit court panel are of the same
political party and zero (0) otherwise.
Indicator variable defined equal to one
(1) if only one of the two other judges
on a three-judge federal circuit court
panel is of the opposite party as the
authoring judge and zero (0) otherwise.
All Mixed is a subset of Mixed Panels.
Indicator variable defined equal to one
(1) if the two other judges on a three-
judge federal circuit court panel are of
the opposite party as the authoring
judge and zero (0) otherwise. All
Opposition is a subset of Mixed Panels.
In any specific opinion, the total number
of outside circuit citations to judges of
the opposite political party (from the
perspective of the judge in question)
divided by the total number of outside
circuit citations in the opinion to any of
the ninety-eight judges in the sample.
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OppositePool
Year_Exp
Chief Judge
Total number of opinions written by the
outside circuit judges of the opposite
political party (from the perspective of
the judge in question) before 1998
divided by the total number of outside
circuit opinions written by the ninety-
eight judges in the sample before 1998.
Number of years that a judge has sat as
a federal circuit court judge (measured
as of 1998).
Indicator variable defined equal to one
(1) if the judge is the chief judge of the
circuit at the time of the opinion and
zero (0) otherwise.
For each particular judge, we calculated
the number of opposing opinions where
a particular judge opposed judges of the
same political party divided by the
number of all opposing opinions (Actual
Same Party Opposing Fraction). For
each judge, we then determined the
political party (as proxied by the party
of the appointing president) of the other
active judges on each circuit from 1998
to 2000 (including those who eventually
took senior status or retired), obtaining
the baseline fraction of same party
judges on the circuit (Predicted Same
Party Opposing Fraction).
Independence is then defined to equal
Actual Same Party Opposing Fraction
minus Predicted Same Party Opposing
Fraction.
Independence
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GHP
OppositionSame Party
OppositionOpposite Party
Top Salient
Measure of political preference for each
judge based on the ideological
preferences of the appointing president
and relevant senators developed in
Giles, Hettinger & Peppers (2001). The
GHP score ranges from -1 (most liberal)
to +1 (most conservative).
Indicator variable defined equal to one
(1) if the opinion is in opposition to a
dissenting opinion of another judge of
the same political party in the same case
and zero (0) otherwise.
Indicator variable defined equal to one
(1) if the opinion is in opposition to a
dissenting opinion of another judge of
the opposite political party in the same
case and zero (0) otherwise.
Indicator variable defined equal to one
(1) if an opinion's subject matter falls
into one of the top nine high-stakes
subject matter categories (Church and
State, Campaign Finance, Federalism,
First Amendment, Rights, Government
Actions, Capital Punishment,
Administrative Law, and Takings and
Property). See Appendix B for
definitions of the subject matter
categories and the classification of the
high-stake categories.
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Bottom Salient
High Citation Judge
Low Citation Judge
Indicator variable defined equal to one
(1) if an opinion's subject matter does
not fall into one of the top nine high-
stakes subject matter categories (Tax,
Federal Business Law, Environment,
Intellectual Property, Torts,
Immigration, Criminal, Labor, Private
Law, and Other). See Appendix B for
definitions of the subject matter
categories and the classification of the
high-stake categories.
Indicator variable defined equal to one
(1) if an opinion is authored by a judge
from our sample of ninety-eight active
circuit court judges from 1998 to 2000
who received an above median level of
outside-circuit citations to the judge's
published opinions written from 1998 to
2000 and zero (0) otherwise.
Indicator variable defined equal to one
(1) if an opinion is authored by a judge
from our sample of ninety-eight active
circuit court judges from 1998 to 2000
who received a less than or equal to
median number of outside circuit
citations to the judge's published
opinions written from 1998 to 2000 and
zero (0) otherwise.
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VI. APPENDIX B: SUBJECT MATTER CATEGORIES
CATEGORY
Private Law
Intellectual
Property
Federal Business
Law
Torts
Criminal
DEFINITION
Contracts; insurance; private arbitration;
creditor v. debtor; lessor-lessee; usury
laws; franchise v. franchisor;
employment contractual disputes;
corporate law; piercing the corporate
veil.
Patents; copyright; trademarks; Lanham
Act (trademark-related actions).
Internal Revenue Code and other tax-
related matters.
Securities regulation; bankruptcy;
antitrust; federal banking laws; unfair
trade practices; Federal Debt Collections
Act; Fair Debt Collection Practices Act;
Truth in Lending Act; deceptive
advertising under the Lanham Act;
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; etc.
Federal Tort Claims Act; medical
malpractice; products liability; wrongful
death; libel; etc.
Sentencing guidelines; prisoners rights;
drugs/controlled substances; attorney-
client privilege in criminal context;
grand jury-related; RICO; search and
seizure (Fourth Amendment); Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); etc.
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excludes capital punishment cases.
Capital punishment-related actions.
Labor
Rights
Government
Actions
Takings and
Property
Campaign Finance
Immigration
Employment issues (excluding
employment contractual disputes);
ERISA; National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB); Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA); Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA); wrongful
discharge; Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA); Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA); employee benefits;
worker's compensation claims;
retaliatory discharge claims.
Race discrimination; sex discrimination;
affirmative action; civil rights; age
discrimination; privacy; abortion; other
individual rights.
Sovereign immunity; False Claims Act;
government forfeiture action.
Takings claims; zoning issues; property
rights.
Campaign finance and any election-
related legal issue.
Immigration-related issues.
First Amendment First Amendment-related issues
(excluding Church and State issues).
Capital
Punishment
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Church and State
Environment
Administrative Law
Federalism
Other
Establishment Clause; Pledge of
Allegiance; funding for private religious
schools; prayer in school; Ten
Commandments.
National Park Service; Clean Air Act;
CERCLA; Superfund; National Forest
Management Act; Endangered Species
Act; EPA; etc.
Review of agency decisionmaking (not
in another subject matter category);
APA; FCC Rates; FERC Rates; Freedom
of Information Act; Social Security
entitlement; Medicare; etc.
State rights; federal preemption;
Commerce Clause power.
Indian law; maritime law; implicit
private rights of actions; judicial process
issues (judge recusal; attorney sanctions;
legal malpractice; attorney ethics-related
actions); etc.
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